|
Despite this increased awareness and the persistent recommendations
for improvement, key areas of information-security risk management and associated
risk metrics continue to receive precious little attention. Although many guidance
documents advocate taking a managed approach to risk — including risk analysis
and assessment — none of them clearly and consistently define what constitutes
a proper risk analysis and assessment. Even the well-known ISO 17799 standard
falls well short of providing the kind of nuts-and-bolts “how-to”
guidance that is needed, in my opinion.
The lack of formalized qualitative and quantitative risk metrics impairs the ability
of risk managers and security professionals to effectively and consistently measure
risk and points to the absence of a sound framework against which to record quantitative
threat-experience data. Establishing a risk-management framework and risk
metrics would greatly improve risk management by giving organizations a basis
for risk analysis and assessment that would enable them to make business
decisions about managing security risks.
SOME PROGRESS MADE As early as the mid-1970s, the basic metrics
of risk were established, but they were not formalized or widely disseminated.
In these early years, a variety of risk-assessment methodologies and techniques
emerged to help organizations identify and manage nonclassified information-security
risks on a cost-benefit basis.
Some of the manual methodologies and automated approaches that were developed
during the 1980s were well-conceived and are still used today. Other approaches
fell by the wayside. Highly subjective qualitative methodologies provided no real
support for the standard business decision-making model, which is based on return
on investment (ROI).
Join our new forums at WebProWorld! Ask your toughest questions or help your peers
solve their issues. |
|
Conducting quantitative risk assessments without supporting automated tools
proved to be almost impossibly time-consuming, complex, and inflexible. Also,
they were completely incapable of supporting the “what-if” analysis
that is essential to sound business decision-making. The inconsistent use of risk
metrics and misinformation about risk further clouded the issues.
There has been progress in developing information-security risk metrics over
the past two decades, but there is still a way to go before standard metrics are
established, adopted, and practiced. To start with, the need to identify, measure,
and manage information-security risk has been established and subsequently reinforced,
albeit tentatively. The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology identified
key qualitative and quantitative risk metrics and established a high-level framework
of the risk-analysis and assessment process related to the broader function of
information-security risk management, but this work was never formalized. Many
organizations have published information-security risk-management guidance, including:
However, in most of the above documents and other guidance, the essential distinctions
between control objectives and controls is either not clearly established
or is not established at all. If the managed risk approach to information security
were not recognized as the best way to achieve good information security, this
would not be a big deal. But it is. It is virtually impossible to measure risk
against “objectives,” but it is not difficult to measure risk against
the lack or ineffective implementation of controls.
In addition to the above guidance publications, the Information
Systems Security Association (ISSA) Guidance for Information Valuation
has established methods and metrics for valuing an organization’s information
assets. Critics who are unaware of this guidance have asserted that the lack of
such metrics is an obstacle to executing quantitative risk analysis and assessment,
because organizations don’t know how to establish the monetary value of
their information assets.
Additionally, a variety of automated disaster-recovery planning, logical access-control,
antivirus, authentication, encryption, and firewall technologies have helped organizations
manage information security. But, that said, without applying quantitative risk-analysis
and assessment techniques to the issues, there is no reliable basis — specifically
ROI — for determining how much money to spend to acquire and administer
these risk-management tools.
Click
Here to Read the Full Article
First appeared at ITAudit
About the Author:
Will Ozier is founder, President and CEO of the information security products
and consulting services firm, OPA Inc. - The Integrated Risk Management Group
(OPA). He is a leading expert in risk assessment, with broad experience consulting
to many Fortune 500 companies and state governments, as well as NASA, GSA, the
US Army, and the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection.
Prior to becoming an information security consultant in 1982, Mr. Ozier held key
technical and management positions with Levi-Strauss, World Savings, United Vintners,
Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, and Wells Fargo Bank. Mr. Ozier was Principal
Author for The Institute of Internal Auditors’ Information Security Management
and Assurance: A Call to Action for Corporate Governance under contract to the
federal Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office. Mr. Ozier was instrumental in
advancing this CIAO initiative as well as recommendations of the PCCIP embodied
in and promoted by this document, advocating quantitative risk assessment and
advancement of the GASSP (now the Generally Accepted Information Security Principles
– GAISP).
Read this newsletter at: http://www.securitypronews.com/2003/0807.html |
|